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Autonomy	and	Aesthetic	Engagement		C.	Thi	Nguyen			(This	is	a	pre-proofed	draft.	Please	cite	the	final	version,	forthcoming	in	Mind.)	
	
	
There	seems	to	be	a	deep	tension	between	two	aspects	of	aesthetic	appreciation.	On	the	one	hand,	
we	care	about	getting	things	right.	Our	attempts	at	aesthetic	judgments	aim	at	correctness.	On	
the	other	hand,	we	demand	autonomy	in	aesthetic	appreciation.	We	want	appreciators	to	arrive	
at	their	aesthetic	judgments	through	their	own	cognitive	efforts,	rather	than	deferring	to	experts.	
These	two	demands	seem	to	be	 in	tension;	after	all,	 if	we	want	to	get	the	right	 judgments,	we	
should	defer	to	the	judgments	of	experts.	How	can	we	resolve	this	tension?	The	best	explanation,	
I	suggest,	is	that	aesthetic	appreciation	is	something	like	a	game.	When	we	play	a	game,	we	try	to	
win.	But	often,	winning	isn’t	the	point;	playing	is.	Aesthetic	appreciation	involves	the	same	flipped	
motivational	structure:	we	aim	at	the	goal	of	correctness,	but	having	correct	judgments	isn’t	the	
point.	The	point	is	the	engaged	process	of	interpreting,	investigating,	and	exploring	the	aesthetic	
object.	Deferring	to	aesthetic	testimony,	then,	makes	the	same	mistake	as	looking	up	the	answer	
to	a	puzzle,	rather	than	solving	it	for	oneself.	The	shortcut	defeats	the	whole	point.	This	suggests	
a	new	account	of	aesthetic	value:	the	engagement	account.	The	primary	value	of	the	activity	of	
aesthetic	appreciation	lies	in	the	process	of	trying	to	generate	correct	judgments,	and	not	in	hav-
ing	correct	judgments.		
	
			 There	seems	to	be	a	deep	tension	between	two	aspects	of	our	practice	of	aesthetic	appreciation.	First,	the	practice	of	aesthetic	appreciation	seems	deeply	cognitive.	We	seem	guided	by	an	interest	in	getting	things	right.	We	not	only	look	at	art;	we	investigate	it.	We	form	trial	judgments	and	then	go	back	for	more,	re-watching	and	re-reading	to	make	sure	we’ve	caught	all	the	details.	We	talk	about	the	reasons	for	our	judgments,	point	out	details	to	one	another,	and	argue	about	what’s	truly	great.	The	way	we	go	about	aesthetic	conversa-tion	and	aesthetic	investigation	seems	to	indicate	that	our	aesthetic	judgments	are	aimed	at	the	truth.		
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At	the	same	time,	we	seem	committed	to	principles	of	individuality	and	autonomy	in	aes-thetic	appreciation.	For	one,	we	seem	to	think	that,	in	aesthetic	appreciation,	we	must	form	our	own	judgments	for	ourselves.	There	is	a	striking	disanalogy	here	between	the	aesthetic	and	empirical	realms.	In	empirical	matters,	we	are	often	willing	to	defer	to	the	judgments	of	others,	especially	when	they	are	experts.	For	example,	I	trust	my	doctor	and	take	whatever	pills	she	tells	me	to	take.	But	in	aesthetic	matters,	we	do	not	seem	so	willing	to	defer.	There	seems	to	be	something	quite	problematic	about	acquiring	the	aesthetic	judgment	that	The-lonious	Monk’s	 solo	 rendition	of	 ‘Smoke	Gets	 in	Your	Eyes’	 is	brilliantly	 complex,	 strictly	from	the	testimony	of	a	jazz	expert.	This	asymmetry	has	struck	some	as	quite	meaningful.	Consider	a	parallel	asymmetry	in	the	moral	realm.	Sarah	McGrath	argues	that	our	unwillingness	to	defer	to	moral	experts	pre-sents	a	significant	challenge	to	moral	realism.	Suppose	I	was	simply	aiming	to	have	correct	moral	beliefs.	In	that	case,	when	I	had	good	reason	to	think	that	some	other	person	was	more	reliable	than	me	on	some	moral	issue,	then	I	ought	to	defer.	However,	such	moral	deference	strikes	us	as	deeply	wrong.	It	can	start	to	seem,	then,	as	if	we	weren’t	really	aiming	at	cor-rectness	at	all.	The	best	explanation	of	this	asymmetry,	some	suggest,	is	moral	expressivism	—	the	view	that	our	moral	judgments	express	our	own	individual	commitments	or	subjective	responses,	rather	 than	asserting	objective	truths	(McGrath	2011).	Notice	 that	 these	argu-ments	apply	just	as	well	to	the	aesthetic	realm.	Perhaps,	then,	our	commitment	to	aesthetic	autonomy	reveals	that	aesthetic	 judgments	are	simply	expressions	of	our	own	responses,	rather	than	assertions	aimed	at	capturing	objective	truths.		These	two	strands	pull	us	in	different	directions.	The	cognitive	aspects	of	aesthetic	life	suggest	that	aesthetic	claims	are	largely	objective;	our	demand	for	autonomy	suggests	that	
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they	are	largely	subjective.	This	seems	puzzling.	As	Kant	put	it,	if	aesthetic	judgments	were	grounded	primarily	in	our	own	felt	responses,	then	what	basis	could	we	have	for	demanding	agreement?	One	standard	response	 is	 to	commit	to	some	form	of	subjectivism	about	aes-thetic	judgment,	and	then	to	offer	an	alternative	explanation	for	all	that	seemingly	cognitive	behavior	of	arguing,	discussing,	and	investigating.	This	is,	perhaps,	Kant’s	path.	Cain	Todd	has	offered	such	an	approach	in	his	modernized	take	on	Kant.1	Says	Todd,	aesthetic	judg-ments	express	our	own	attitudes,	rather	than	asserting	truths.	But	we	have	social	reasons	to	express	these	attitudes	as	if	we	were	asserting	truths	—	for	example,	we	might	be	trying	to	demand	agreement,	or	urging	others	to	share	our	responses.	Approaches	like	this	treat	the	demand	for	autonomy	as	weighing	decisively	in	favor	of	subjectivism,	and	then	attempt	to	provide	an	accommodating	explanation	for	our	apparently	cognitive	behavior.	I	will	attempt	to	resolve	the	tension	between	autonomy	and	cognitivity	in	the	opposite	direction.	I	will	suggest	that	aesthetic	judgments	are	cognitive,	and	then	offer	an	accommo-dating	explanation	for	our	requirement	for	autonomy.	In	my	account,	aesthetic	judgments	can	be	straightforwardly	correct	or	incorrect,	but	the	reason	we	seek	correct	judgment	in	aesthetic	appreciation	differs	from	ordinary	empirical	life.	In	much	of	practical	empirical	life,	we	value	having	the	correct	judgments	themselves.	We	engage	in	the	activity	of	inquiry	for	the	sake	of	its	products.	In	aesthetic	appreciation,	on	the	other	hand,	we	value	the	activity	of	forming	judgments	more	than	we	do	getting	our	judgments	right.	In	this	way,	the	practice	of	aesthetic	appreciation	has	a	motivational	structure	similar	to	that	of	playing	a	game.	In	much	
                                                             1	This	expressivist,	quasi-realist	reading	of	Kant	was	originally	proposed,	and	then	dismissed,	by	Robert	Hopkins	(Hopkins	2001).	Todd’s	article	is	an	attempt	to	resuscitate	Hopkins’s	proposal	(Todd	2004).	I	will,	for	the	most	part,	avoid	coming	down	too	firmly	on	the	relationship	between	my	views	and	Kant’s,	because	relevant	aspects	of	Kant’s	view	here	are	still	being	debated.	For	recent	discussions	of	the	debate,	see	(Gins-borg	2015;	Gorodeisky	and	Marcus	2018).		
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of	game-play,	we	aim	at	winning,	but	winning	isn’t	the	point:	playing	is.	In	much	of	our	aes-thetic	lives,	we	aim	at	correct	aesthetic	judgments,	but	actually	having	them	isn’t	the	point.	The	process	of	seeking	them	is.	Our	dedication	to	aesthetic	autonomy	reveals	that	we	value	aesthetic	engagement	over	aesthetic	conclusions.				
Autonomy	and	Acquaintance	The	importance	of	aesthetic	autonomy,	however,	has	been	masked	in	recent	conversa-tion	by	the	dominance	of	a	distinct	consideration	—	that	of	aesthetic	acquaintance.	The	first	task,	then,	is	to	distinguish	between	these	two	very	different	demands.		The	demand	for	aesthetic	acquaintance	is	the	demand	that	one’s	aesthetic	judgment	of	an	object	proceed	from	one’s	direct	experience	of	that	object.	The	demand	for	aesthetic	au-tonomy,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 is	 the	 demand	 that	 one	 come	 to	 one’s	 aesthetic	 conclusions	through	one’s	own	efforts.	Aesthetic	acquaintance	asks	that	we	experience	the	thing	for	our-selves,	while	aesthetic	autonomy	demands	that	we	draw	our	conclusions	for	ourselves.	And	it	 is	the	demand	for	aesthetic	autonomy,	I	think,	that	will	prove	key	in	understanding	the	value	of	aesthetic	engagement.	But	the	demands	for	autonomy	and	acquaintance	have	some-times	been	confused.	And	when	they	are	distinguished,	more	attention	has	usually	been	paid	to	the	demand	for	acquaintance.	So	let’s	start	by	getting	clearer	on	these	two	demands.		The	 demand	 for	 autonomy	 concerns	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 aesthetic	 judgments	 arise	through	our	own	efforts.	We	can	state	that	demand	in	the	form	of	a	principle:		 	
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Autonomy	Principle:	One	ought	to	arrive	at	one’s	aesthetic	judgments	through	the	ap-plication	of	one’s	own	faculties	and	abilities.		According	to	this	principle,	one	ought	to	do	one’s	own	aesthetic	thinking,	investigating,	interpreting,	and	the	like.	One	should	not	outsource	aesthetic	judgments	to,	say,	the	experts,	even	 if	 they	are	known	to	be	more	reliable.	 I	mean	 ‘aesthetic	 judgments’	here	 in	a	broad	sense,	including	both	judgments	about	the	presence	of	particular	aesthetic	in	an	object,	like	sensuousness	or	delicacy,	as	well	as	overall	evaluative	judgments.	One	should	decide	for	one-self	whether	Jackson	Pollock	is	empty	or	profound,	whether	Thelonious	Monk	is	full	of	bi-zarre	angles	or	full	of	sensuous	textures.2		The	second	principle	is	one	of	acquaintance,	which	posits	a	demand	for	direct	experience:		
Acquaintance	Principle:	One	ought	to	arrive	at	an	aesthetic	judgment	on	the	basis	of	one’s	own	direct	experience	of	the	object	of	judgment.3			According	to	this	principle,	we	need	to	have	actually	heard	John	Coltrane’s	Africa/Brass	
                                                             2	One	substantial	question	about	this	presentation	of	the	autonomy	principle	is	what	to	do	about	cases	when	we	act	on	aesthetic	recommendations.	Many	solutions	have	been	suggested.	Hopkins’s	solution	is	to	suggest	that	the	norm	of	autonomy	lapses	because	of	an	application	of	‘ought	implies	can’	-	before	you	have	seen	a	work,	you	cannot	actually	judge	it	for	yourself,	so	you	cannot	be	required	to	(Hopkins	2011).	Aaron	Meskin	suggests	that	recommendations	only	give	us	information	about	the	likelihood	of	our	rendering	an	aes-thetic	judgment	(Meskin	2007).	Elsewhere,	I	have	argued	that	that	recommendations	pass	information	about	aesthetic	merit	(Nguyen	2017).	The	argument	of	this	paper	is	compatible	with	all	of	these	approaches.	3	This	expression	of	the	acquaintance	principle	is	intended	to	be	suitably	minimal	so	as	to	be	compatible	with	a	wide	swath	of	the	literature	on	testimony	and	acquaintance,	and	to	avoid	commitment	to	any	of	the	disputed	details	about	the	best	articulation	of	the	principle	(Budd	2003;	Livingston	2003;	Meskin	2004,	2007;	Laetz	2008;	Hopkins	2011;	Konigsberg	2012;	Whiting	2015;	Lord	2016;	McKinnon	2017;	Ransom	2019).	
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for	ourselves	or	tasted	those	lengua	tacos	for	ourselves	in	order	to	render	an	aesthetic	judg-ment.4	The	Acquaintance	Principle	makes	demands	about	our	getting	 the	direct	aesthetic	input	for	ourselves,	while	the	Autonomy	Principle	makes	demands	about	coming	to	conclu-sions	for	ourselves.5		These	two	principles	often	rear	their	heads	in	the	discussion	of	the	legitimacy	of	acquir-ing	aesthetic	beliefs	via	testimony.	We	seem	to	have	the	intuition	that	we	should	not	acquire	aesthetic	judgments	from	bare	testimonial	reports.	This	intuition	is	often	taken	to	support	the	so-called	‘pessimistic’	view	of	aesthetic	testimony	—	that	we	cannot	gain	aesthetic	belief	through	testimony	(Hopkins	2011,	p.	139).6	Notice	that	both	the	Autonomy	Principle	and	the	Acquaintance	Principle	have	the	resources	to	explain	this	intuition.	In	acquiring	an	aesthetic	judgment	from	bare	testimony,	I	have	both	failed	to	go	through	the	cognitive	processes	for	myself	and	failed	to	directly	experience	the	object	of	my	judgment	for	myself.		The	discussion	of	aesthetic	testimony	often	treats	the	two	principles	as	competing	expla-nations	for	the	same	set	of	intuitions,	and	then	proceeds	to	try	to	figure	out	which	principle	offers	the	better	explanation.	For	example,	Hopkins	considers	the	following	argument	in	fa-vor	of	the	Acquaintance	Principle	over	the	Autonomy	Principle.	The	Autonomy	Principle,	he	
                                                             4	There	are,	of	course,	all	sorts	of	boundary	cases	involving,	say,	arriving	at	an	aesthetic	judgment	of	a	painting	after	imagining	it	based	in	a	rich	description.	I	will	set	those	boundary	cases	aside	for	the	sake	of	the	present	discussion,	and	concentrate	on	the	clearest	cases	of	violations	of	the	Acquaintance	Principle.	5	I	adapt	these	expressions	of	the	principle,	and	this	approximate	division	of	the	space,	from	Robert	Hop-kins’s	discussion	of	aesthetic	testimony	(Hopkins	2011).		6	As	Madeleine	Ransom	notes,	this	intuition	is	fairly	specific.	Specifically,	the	intuitions	seem	to	forbid	ac-quiring	an	aesthetic	judgment	from	‘bare	testimony’,	in	which	I	acquire	an	aesthetic	judgment	that	p	based	on	the	testimony	that	p.	This	is	contrasted	with	acquiring	an	aesthetic	judgment	from	‘rich	testimony’,	where	I	render	an	aesthetic	judgment	that	p	based	on	testimony	as	to	particular,	richly	described	details	(Ransom	2019).	Also,	the	standard	account	of	the	pessimistic	intuition	has	been	sometimes	challenged;	for	example,	Jon	Robson	has	argued	that	the	pessimistic	intuitions	are	only	about	norms	of	asserting	based	on	aesthetic	testimony,	rather	than	on	norms	of	belief	about	testimony	(Robson	2015).	I	will	presume	for	this	paper	the	standard	version	of	the	pessimistic	account,	which	includes	a	norm	against	acquiring	a	belief	through	testi-mony.	
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says,	 licenses	too	much.	 It	would	 license	acquiring	aesthetic	 judgments	through	inductive	reasoning,	so	long	as	that	reasoning	was	performed	autonomously.	Suppose	I	have	seen	fifty	pieces	of	abstract	expressionism	and	find	them	all	pleasingly	textured	and	rich.	I	have	not	yet	seen	Rothko’s	No.	61	(Rust	and	Blue),	but	I	 form	the	aesthetic	 judgment	that	 it,	 too,	 is	pleasingly	 textured	and	rich,	based	on	 induction	 from	my	observations	of	other	pieces	of	abstract	expressionism.	Notice	that	the	cognitive	processes	 involved	are	all	my	own.	Still,	this	seems	wrong	way	 to	go	about	making	aesthetic	 judgments.	The	Autonomy	Principle,	says	Hopkins,	cannot	account	for	what’s	wrong	with	inductive	judgments	(p.	151-2).	Only	the	Acquaintance	Principle	can.	It	says	that	should	actually	experience	No.	61	itself	before	I	render	any	aesthetic	judgment	of	that	work;	reasoning	from	induction	violates	that	require-ment.	For	reasons	like	these,	the	conversation	about	deference	and	aesthetic	testimony	has	largely	come	to	revolve	around	the	Acquaintance	Principle.				
The	case	for	autonomy	The	Acquaintance	Principle	certainly	explains	what	is	wrong	with	making	aesthetic	judg-ments	from	induction	in	a	way	that	the	Autonomy	Principle	cannot.	But	the	Acquaintance	Principle,	by	itself,	cannot	explain	other	parts	of	the	story.		Consider	the	following	case:		
Audio	Tour	Brandon	considers	himself	to	be	an	art-lover.	Whenever	he	goes	to	a	museum,	he	rents	the	audio	tour	and	explores	the	museum	at	its	direction.	He	looks	at	the	paintings	he	is	told	
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to	look	at,	studies	those	details	which	are	called	to	his	attention,	and	always	assents	to	the	audio	tour’s	judgment	of	the	quality,	importance,	and	aesthetic	properties	present	based	on	those	details.	He	never	looks	for	any	details	that	aren’t	specified	by	the	audio	tour,	nor	does	he	ever	form	aesthetic	judgments	without	the	explicit	guidance	and	suggestion	of	an	audio	tour.	But	he	does	make	sure	to	look	at	each	specified	painting,	and	to	find	and	note	any	spec-ified	detail,	before	allowing	himself	to	accept	the	suggested	judgment.	And	he	only	accepts	the	suggested	judgment	when	he	sees	the	relevant	aesthetic	properties	for	himself,	after	per-mitting	his	attention	to	be	entirely	directed	by	the	audio	tour.	Furthermore,	he	conducts	his	entire	aesthetic	life	in	this	manner.	He	does	not	use	the	audio	tours	as	a	jumping	off	point	for	future	exploration,	but	always	seeks	expert	guidance	to	direct	his	engagement	with	any	art-work	he	encounters.	He	never	attempts	to	establish	his	own	views	when	such	guidance	is	unavailable.			Brandon’s	life	is	missing	something	important.	It	might	be	perfectly	fine	to	begin	one’s	aesthetic	education	with	audio	tours,	or	to	use	them	as	a	jumping-off	point	for	further	reflec-tion.	But	Brandon’s	use	of	audio	tours	isn’t	just	a	step	along	the	way;	it	is	the	totality	and	endpoint	of	his	aesthetic	activity.	His	aesthetic	life	seems	not	to	be	fully	realized.	He	lacks	independence,	we	want	to	say;	he	does	not	fully	engage	with	artworks	in	the	right	way.	But	notice	that	only	the	Autonomy	Principle	can	explain	what’s	missing	from	Brandon’s	aesthetic	life.	He	is	certainly	acquainted	with	the	aesthetic	properties,	and	his	judgments	are	formed	from	 direct	 experience	 of	 an	 aesthetic	 object	 and	 its	 relevant	 aesthetic	 qualities.	What’s	wrong	with	Brandon’s	conduct	is	not	a	lack	of	acquaintance;	it	is	that	he	is	aesthetically	sub-servient.	He	is	failing	to	reach	the	conclusions	through	the	application	of	his	own	faculties	
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and	resources.	He	is	letting	another	direct	his	attention,	suggest	interpretations,	and	suggest	conclusions.	Though	he	 is	 certainly	 engaging	 some	of	his	 capacities,	 such	as	 the	ones	 re-quired	to	see	details	and	to	grasp	interpretations,	he	is	not	engaging	his	higher-order	capac-ities	for	aesthetic	agency.	He	isn’t	choosing	which	details	to	attend	to.	He	isn’t	forming	his	own	interpretations	and	using	them	to	guide	his	attention	and	investigation.	He	is	not	en-tirely	lacking	in	aesthetic	autonomy,	but	he	is	missing	a	substantial	part	of	it.	The	Autonomy	Principle	by	itself	cannot	explain	what’s	wrong	with	induction,	and	the	Acquaintance	Principle	by	itself	cannot	explain	what’s	wrong	with	Audio	Tour	Brandon.	The	best	account,	then,	is	not	that	these	two	principles	are	competing	explanations	of	the	same	phenomenon,	but	that	they	are	both	normatively	active.	Each	principle	articulates	a	different	demand	bearing	on	our	aesthetic	judgment.			It	will	be	useful	here	to	compare	Audio	Tour	Brandon	with	something	of	an	opposite	case:		
Independent	and	Inductive	Kate	watches	a	lot	of	movies,	and	forms	strong,	personal,	carefully	thought-out	reactions	to	all	of	them.	After	she	has	seen	enough	movies	from	a	director	or	production	group,	she	will	sometimes	begin	 to	also	 form	some	 inductive	 judgments.	She	states	 these	 judgments	without	 qualification.	 For	 example,	 she	will	 say	 that	Quentin	Tarantino’s	Hateful	 Eight	 is	clever,	perverse,	and	postmodern	without	having	seen	it	herself,	based	entirely	on	induction	from	 previous	 experiences	with	 Quentin	 Tarantino	movies.	 She	will	 also	 say	 that	 Justice	
League	is	boring,	corporate,	ponderous	and	generally	worthless,	without	having	seen	it	for	herself,	based	on	induction	from	previous	experiences	with	Warner	Brothers	versions	of	DC	comic	book	properties.	
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	What	would	we	say	about	Audio	Tour	Brandon	and	Inductive	Kate?	Notice	that	we	might	challenge	particular	claims	of	Kate’s.	I	would	not	accept	her	particular	judgment	that	Justice	
League	was	boring	or	 that	Hateful	Eight	was	clever	precisely	because	she	 lacks	direct	ac-quaintance.	However,	I	would	also	think	that,	in	general,	her	aesthetic	life	was	going	quite	well,	though	I	would	complain	that	some	of	her	particular	expressions	of	aesthetic	judgments	were	misleading	or	unfounded.	My	reaction	to	Audio	Tour	Brandon	is	the	reverse.	I	would	accept	particular	aesthetic	judgments	of	his	—	say,	that	Van	Gogh’s	Irises	displayed	a	bold	and	impactful	use	of	line,	which	reveals	a	subtle	influence	from	Hokusai.	I	might,	admittedly,	accept	those	aesthetic	 judgments	with	a	bit	of	an	eye-roll,	but	 I	wouldn’t	 throw	them	out	altogether.	I	trust	Brandon	to	be	a	good	conveyance	of	reliable	aesthetic	judgment,	at	least	enough	to	allow	his	expressed	judgments	to	direct	my	action	and	attention.7	However,	I	also	think	that	Audio	Tour	Brandon	is	living	a	much	more	impoverished	aesthetic	life	than	Kate.	If	I	were	Brandon’s	friend,	I	would	push	him	to	make	more	judgments	for	himself,	to	let	his	attention	roam	at	his	own	direction	–	to	not	only	feel	for	himself,	but	to	discover	for	himself	the	aesthetic	intricacies	of	these	artworks.	If	he	said	that	he	was	afraid	of	getting	something	wrong,	I	would	reply	that	getting	all	your	facts	in	a	row	wasn’t	the	end-all	and	be-all	of	aes-thetic	life.	Inductive	Kate,	on	the	other	hand,	seems	to	be	leading	a	rich	and	fulfilling	aesthetic	life,	albeit	one	plagued	by	the	occasional	bizarre	overreach.	I	might	urge	Kate	to	temper	the	exact	wording	of	her	claims,	but	not	to	change	the	basic	contour	of	her	aesthetic	life.	Audio	
                                                             7	I	am	here,	I	admit,	making	claims	about	what	counts	as	aesthetic	judgments,	without	offering	an	account	of	what	it	is	to	be	aesthetic.	I	am	following	here	the	strategy	suggested	by	Dominic	Lopes	—	that	we	try	avoid-ing,	for	the	moment,	getting	caught	up	in	defining	the	boundary	of	the	aesthetic,	and	see	how	far	we	can	get.	I	am	instead	taking	here,	as	an	identifying	principle	loosely	adapted	from	Lopes,	that	a	marker	of	a	real	aes-thetic	judgment	is	that	it	is	a	good	basis	for	further	aesthetic	actions	(Lopes	2018,	p.	46-8).		
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Tour	Brandon,	on	 the	other	hand,	 is	 fully	entitled	 to	 the	particular	content	of	each	of	his	claims,	but	he	seems	to	be	missing	out	on	something	rather	more	galactic.		I	have	suggested	that	the	Autonomy	Principle	can	help	to	explain	the	asymmetry	between	aesthetic	and	empirical	testimony.	But,	one	might	worry,	the	Autonomy	Principle	can’t	do	that	explanatory	work	because	it	 is,	 in	fact,	a	general	requirement	for	all	agents	in	all	do-mains.	After	all,	shouldn’t	we	always	think	for	ourselves,	directing	our	own	attention	and	coming	up	with	our	own	theories	about	the	world?	How	could	a	general	principle	of	agency	account	for	the	asymmetry	between	the	aesthetic	and	the	empirical?		As	a	matter	of	fact,	I	do	not	think	that	we	demand	the	same	form	of	autonomy	in	both	the	aesthetic	and	empirical	domains.8	Let’s	distinguish	between	two	forms	of	intellectual	auton-omy:	direct	autonomy	and	indirect	autonomy.	To	have	direct	intellectual	autonomy	over	a	given	judgment,	we	need	to	grasp	all	the	reasons,	evidence,	and	considerations	which	sup-port	the	content	of	that	judgment	for	ourselves.	To	have	indirect	intellectual	autonomy	over	a	 judgment,	we	can	acquire	that	 judgment	through	testimony	from	a	trusted	source,	pro-vided	that	we	grasp	the	reasons	for	our	trust.	Indirect	autonomy	is	the	weaker	requirement:	we	need	only	understand	our	trust	the	external	source	of	our	judgments,	rather	than	under-standing	the	content	of	the	judgments	itself.9		In	our	life	with	the	sciences,	the	best	we	can	hope	for	is	indirect	autonomy	over	most	of	
                                                             8	I	focus,	in	this	paper,	on	explaining	the	asymmetry	between	the	aesthetic	and	the	empirical,	leaving	largely	to	the	side	the	asymmetry	between	the	aesthetic	and	the	moral.	This	is	because,	while	almost	all	agree	about	the	direction	of	asymmetry	in	the	aesthetic/empirical	case,	not	all	agree	in	the	aesthetic/moral	case.	Elsewhere,	I	have	suggested	that	our	demand	for	autonomy	is	stronger	in	the	aesthetic	than	the	moral	(Ngu-yen	2017).	Others	have	suggested	that	our	demand	for	autonomy	is	weaker	in	the	aesthetic	than	the	moral	(Driver	2006),	and	others	have	suggested	that	they	are	precisely	on	a	par	(Howell	2014).	I	will	make	some	tentative	remarks	on	this	topic	at	the	end	of	this	paper,	but	I	will	otherwise	leave	this	topic	for	later	discus-sion.	9	This	distinction	drawn	from	my	discussion	of	expertise	and	the	fragmentation	of	intellectual	autonomy	(Nguyen	2018).	The	discussion	of	trust	and	intellectual	autonomy	is	vast;	for	starting	points,	see	(Hardwig	1985,	1991;	Goldberg	2010)	
12 
the	domains	on	which	we	depend.	Contemporary	science	is	so	vast,	no	individual	can	hope	to	possess	direct	intellectual	autonomy	over	all	the	scientific	judgments	which	they	must	use.	As	Elijah	Millgram	puts	it,	the	character	of	modern	epistemic	life	is	dominated	by	the	hyper-specialization	of	expert	domains.	Non-scientists	must	trust	the	 judgments	of	scientific	ex-perts	without	being	able	to	understand	those	experts’	reasons.	And	even	among	the	special-ists,	each	expert	must	depend	on	the	judgments	of	other	experts	without	being	able	to	fully	grasp	the	grounds	for	all	those	judgments	for	themselves.	The	doctor	must	trust	the	biologist,	the	 chemist,	 and	 the	 engineers	 behind	 their	 instruments.	Nobody	 can	understand	 all	 the	fields	of	science	on	their	own;	the	best	they	can	do	is	to	manage	their	trust	in	others	with	some	degree	of	autonomy	(Millgram	2015;	Nguyen	2018).	We	can	now	better	articulate	the	key	asymmetry:	in	empirical	life	we	demand	only	indirect	autonomy,	but	in	aesthetic	life	we	demand	direct	autonomy.		There	are,	then,	two	different	possible	specifications	of	the	Autonomy	Principle:		
Direct	Autonomy	Principle:	One	ought	to	arrive	at	one’s	aesthetic	judgments	of	an	object	through	the	application	of	one’s	own	faculties	and	abilities,	without	the	use	of	testimony.10				
Indirect	Autonomy	Principle:	One	ought	to	arrive	at	one’s	aesthetic	judgment	of	an	object	through	the	application	of	one’s	own	faculties	and	abilities,	including	acquiring	
                                                             10	I	take	the	Direct	Autonomy	Principle	to	be	a	stronger	requirement	than	the	requirement	that	is	usually	attributed	to	Kant.	For	example,	Keren	Gorodeisky	suggests	that	Kant	requires	that	an	aesthetic	judgment	proceed	from	the	judger’s	own	pleasurable	response,	in	addition	to	the	judger’s	grasping	of	the	merit	of	that	response	(Gorodeisky	2010).	Notice	that,	in	Kant’s	version,	there	is	no	requirement	that	the	judger’s	pleasure	or	grasp	proceed	from	their	own	self-directed	inquiry;	they	could	be	led	to	it.		
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judgments	about	the	objects	through	testimony,	so	 long	as	the	choice	of	testimonial	sources	arises	through	the	application	of	one’s	own	faculties	and	abilities.	
	My	claim	is	that	in	aesthetic	appreciation	we	demand	the	Direct	Autonomy	Principle.	We	do	not	make	the	analogous	demand	in	empirical,	scientific	 life;	 there,	we	only	ask	for	the	much	weaker,	indirect	form	of	intellectual	autonomy.	Why	this	difference?	I	will	argue	that	it	is	because	science	and	art	appreciation	have	very	different	purposes.	In	art	appreciation,	we	aim	at	making	correct	aesthetic	judgments.	But	having	correct	judgments	isn’t	the	purpose	of	the	practice.	Our	purpose	is	to	engage	in	the	activity	of	trying	to	make	correct	judgments.	We	shouldn’t	defer	to	aesthetic	testimony	be-cause	figuring	 it	 for	ourselves	 is	 the	whole	point.	On	the	other	hand,	we	demand	indirect	autonomy	in	empirical	life	because	we	significantly	value	getting	things	right,	and	that	value	often	outweighs	the	values	associated	with	doing	things	for	ourselves.		The	account	also	suggests	a	larger	picture,	which	might	help	to	illuminate	the	complex	relationship	between	 the	Acquaintance	Principle	and	 the	various	 forms	of	 the	Autonomy	Principle.	Let	me	briefly	sketch	that	picture.	Suppose,	 for	the	moment,	that	we	accept	the	common	view	that	the	Acquaintance	Principle	captures	a	constitutive	feature	of	aesthetic	judgments.11	In	that	case,	we	could	understand	the	two	principles	as	arising	from	different	considerations.	The	Acquaintance	Principle	concerns	what	it	is	to	be	an	aesthetic	judgment,	while	the	Direct	Autonomy	Principle	arises	from	our	purpose	in	making	aesthetic	judgments.	Let’s	call	this	the	split-level	view;	it	separates	the	norms	involved	into	ones	arising	from	the	
                                                             11	This	claim	is	widely,	though	not	universally,	accepted.	Notice	that,	for	those	that	reject	the	constitutive	normativity	of	the	Acquaintance	Principle,	all	my	claims	concerning	the	Direct	Autonomy	Principle’s	relation-ship	with	value	would	still	hold.	
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constitutive	level	of	explanation	and	the	value	level.	The	split-level	view	would	resolve	the	seeming	competition	between	the	Acquaintance	Principle	and	the	Direct	Autonomy	Princi-ple.	And	it	would	explain	why	we	think	Audio	Tour	Brandon	is	missing	some	of	the	point	of	aesthetic	life,	though	we	would	allow	that	he	was	still	engaged	in	aesthetic	activity.	He	is	not	entirely	outside	the	realm	of	the	aesthetic	as,	say,	would	be	somebody	that	invested	in	paint-ings	for	economic	reasons,	based	on	purchasing	trends.	He’s	in	the	right	domain,	but	half-asleep	at	the	wheel.	The	split-level	view	strikes	me	as	quite	plausible,	but	I	will	leave	it	aside	for	future	exploration.			
What	is	the	value	in	direct	autonomy?		Let’s	retreat	to	the	more	 local	claim,	to	which	I	will	devote	the	rest	of	 this	paper.	The	Direct	Autonomy	Principle,	I’ve	proposed,	can	be	explained	by	a	particular	story	about	the	motivational	structure	of	art	appreciation:	that	the	value	of	aesthetic	appreciation	lies	in	or	arises	from	the	processes	of	engagement	involved	in	forming	aesthetic	judgments.	‘Aesthetic	engagement’	here	includes	our	higher-level	cognition	of	aesthetic	objects:	searching	for	con-nections,	rethinking	interpretations,	discovering	affective	resonances.	It	also	includes	low-level	forms	of	engagement	such	as	perceptual	engagement:	actively	shifting	one’s	attention	from	one	perceptual	detail	to	the	next,	and	then	assembling	those	details	into	a	larger	struc-ture.	And	it	includes	the	way	these	forms	of	engagement	feed	into	one	another,	as	my	inter-pretation	and	affective	responses	influence	where	I	direct	my	attention,	and	vice	versa.	Aes-thetic	engagement	includes	all	the	perceptual,	cognitive,	and	affective	processes	we	actively	deploy	on	our	way	to	generating	an	aesthetic	judgment.	
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Here	is	my	proposal:	we	perform	the	various	aesthetic	activities	of	perception	and	inves-tigation	for	the	sake	of	our	involvement	in	the	activity	of	seeking	correct	judgments,	rather	than	for	the	sake	of	actually	having	made	correct	judgments.	In	other	words,	though	the	aes-thetic	activity	of	appreciation	usually	culminates	in	the	issuance	of	aesthetic	judgments,	that	activity	is	not	made	valuable	by	the	issuance	of	those	judgments	or	by	their	correctness.	Ra-ther,	we	aim	at	making	correct	judgments	for	the	sake	of	engaging	in	the	attempt	to	get	them	right.	Let	us	call	this	the	engagement	account	of	the	value	of	aesthetic	autonomy.	The	engage-ment	account	states	that	the	primary	value	of	the	activity	of	aesthetic	appreciation	comes	from	the	process	of	generating	judgments	and	not	the	end-product	—	the	judgments	them-selves.		In	some	sense,	the	engagement	account	is	quite	intuitive.	I	listen	to	music	for	the	sake	of	the	listening	itself,	and	not	for	the	sake	of	having	made	correct	judgment	about	the	quality	of	the	music.	But	this	simple	observation	has	many	philosophical	dividends.	The	account	an-swers	our	question	about	the	value	of	direct	autonomy.	The	demand	for	direct	autonomy	is	important	because	 it	encourages	aesthetic	engagement.	Furthermore,	 the	engagement	ac-count	explains	the	asymmetry	between	aesthetic	judgment	and	scientific	judgment.	The	rea-son	we	defer	to	expert	testimony	in	the	sciences,	but	not	in	aesthetic	appreciation,	is	that	getting	correct	 judgments	 is	 the	primary	source	of	value	 in	 the	sciences.	However,	 in	 the	practice	of	aesthetic	appreciation,	getting	correct	judgments	is	less	important	than	the	pro-cesses	we	go	through	in	forming	those	judgments	for	ourselves.12		
                                                             12	A	complication:	as	Finnur	Dellsén	points	out,	we	seem	to	require	scientific	experts	to	be	directly	autono-mous	when	working	within	their	own	specialist	domain,	but	we	do	not	require	such	direct	autonomy	for	their	grasp	of	adjacent	domains	—	even	when	they	depend	on	and	apply	claims	from	those	adjacent	domains.	The	best	explanation,	argues	Dellsén,	is	that	science	is	guided	by	norms	of	long-term	communal	correctness,	ra-ther	than	norms	of	individual	correctness.	That	is,	if	a	scientist	were	interested	in	maximizing	their	own	judg-
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What	might	the	value	be	in	directly	autonomous	aesthetic	engagement?	Let’s	step	back	a	moment	 and	 consider	 our	 complicated	 relationship	 to	 aesthetic	 testimony	 and	 aesthetic	judgment.	Audio	tours	and	other	forms	of	critical	guidance	can	play	a	crucial	role	in	a	healthy,	well-balanced	aesthetic	life.	There	are	many	felicitous	uses	of	aesthetic	testimony	and	many	contexts	where	we	happily	relax	our	demand	for	aesthetic	autonomy.	The	problem	for	Bran-don	is	not	in	his	use	of	the	audio	tour,	but	in	his	disinclination	to	move	past	it.	Much,	then,	seems	to	depend	on	how	exactly	the	aesthetic	appreciator	uses	aesthetic	testimony.	Is	their	use	open-ended	or	closed-ended?	Some	ways	of	using	aesthetic	 testimony	seem	to	quickly	terminate	one’s	aesthetic	engagement.	For	example,	when	 two	 friends	are	 involved	 in	an	aesthetic	dispute,	it	seems	wrong	to	simply	turn	to	some	expert	to	settle	the	matter.	Suppose	we	were	to	disagree	about	the	aesthetic	value	of	Satoshi	Kon’s	psychedelic	anime	Paprika,	and	I	tried	to	settle	it	once	and	for	all	by	consulting	the	review	aggregation	site	Rotten	To-matoes	and	pointing	out	that	83%	of	critics	had	rendered	a	positive	judgment.	The	way	I’m	using	aesthetic	testimony	here	skims	off	a	supposedly	authoritative	overall	evaluation	of	the	film,	while	leaving	me	out	of	touch	with	the	particular	reasons	for	that	evaluation.	This	rela-tionship	to	testimony	cuts	me	off	from	the	specific	attention-guiding	features	of	critical	dis-cussion.	 It	 terminates	my	engagement	with	the	aesthetic	details.13	 If,	on	the	other	hand,	 I	reacted	to	our	dispute	by	reading	essays	from	sensitive	film	critics,	re-watching	the	movie	
                                                             ments’	correctness,	they	should,	in	fact,	always	defer	to	the	consensus	view,	even	in	their	own	terrain.	How-ever,	it	is	crucial	that	we	enforce	norms	of	direct	intellectual	autonomy	for	experts	in	their	own	domain.	These	norms	are	vital	for	the	long-term,	collaborative	pursuit	of	correctness.	Outsiders	need	to	use	expert	consensus	as	a	guide,	but	the	consensus	of	experts	is	only	valuable	if	the	experts	have	reasoned	inde-pendently.	The	ideal	arrangement	for	the	long-term	collaborative	pursuit	of	correctness,	then,	is	that	we defer	to	others	for	facts	outside	of	our	own	realm	of	expertise,	but	adopt	norms	of	direct	autonomy	when	inside	our	own	realm	of	expertise	(Dellsén	2018).	The	particular	structure	of	the	demand	for	autonomy	that	we	find	in	science	—	direct	autonomy	for	experts	in	their	own	domain,	but	indirect	otherwise	—	is	precisely	what	we	should	expect	for	a	social	practice	oriented	towards	producing	long-term,	collective	correctness.	But	notice	that	with	aesthetic	appreciation,	we	demand	something	very	different:	direct	autonomy	for	all. 13	This	comment	is	indebted	to	an	analysis	of	Matt	Strohl’s	(Strohl	2017).	
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while	attending	to	the	 features	those	critics	pointed	out,	and	then	used	what	 I	 learned	 in	further	engagements	with	film,	then	my	use	of	testimony	seems	unproblematic.	That	is	an	engagement-encouraging	use	of	aesthetic	testimony.	A	problem	with	Audio	Tour	Brandon	is	not	simply	that	he	lets	his	attention	be	directed	by	an	authoritative	source.	Rather,	it	is	that	he	 terminates	 his	 engagement	 there,	 rather	 than	 using	 those	 authoritative	 directions	 as	springboards	to	further	engagement.14		But	problem	here	isn’t	simply	about	how	deference	can	limit	the	quantity	of	engagement	available	to	the	guided	appreciator.	Fully	autonomous	engagement	seems	qualitatively	bet-ter.	A	crucial	part	of	the	activity	of	aesthetic	appreciation	lies	not	only	in	the	content	and	order	of	attention,	but	in	the	fact	that	the	appreciator	actively	chooses	where	to	direct	their	own	attention.	An	autonomous	appreciator	is	an	agent	with	respect	to	their	own	attention.	And	that	agency	helps	to	cultivate	a	different	kind	of	attention	and	a	different	mental	rela-tionship	with	the	object	of	their	attention.	This	is,	in	a	very	intuitive	sense,	what	it	means	to	be	truly	engaged.	One	analyzes	the	input	and	decides	which	features	to	attend	to	next,	which	possibilities	to	explore.	One	inhabits	one’s	investigations	more	fully	when	one	has	to	guide	them	from	moment	to	moment.	There	is	a	useful	parallel	in	Mill’s	discussion	of	the	value	of	free	speech.	Mill	thought	that	one	needed	to	constantly	defend	one’s	beliefs	in	order	to	keep	them	alive.	Without	the	pres-sure	to	actively	rethink,	reconsider,	and	reformulate,	one’s	beliefs	would	fall	into	habit	and	routine;	they	would	transition	from	live	beliefs	into	mere	words	—	‘the	shell	and	husk	only’.	
                                                             14	This	distinction	loosely	modeled	on	some	suggestions	from	Philip	Nickel	on	the	nature	of	moral	testi-mony	(Nickel	2001).	I	have	offered	some	discussion	of	Nickel’s	account	(Nguyen	2010).	
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Beliefs	needed	to	be	constantly	defended	through	a	process	of	analysis	and	inquiry	to	main-tain	‘a	livelier	feeling	of	the	meaning	of	their	creed’.15	Aesthetic	engagement	strikes	me	as	playing	 a	 similar	 role.	 Active	 engagement	 keeps	 one’s	 aesthetic	 judgments	 alive	 in	 one’s	mind.16		Notice	that	valuable	engagement	can	arise	in	the	process	of	rendering	either	a	positive	or	negative	judgment.	It	can	be	a	valuable	form	of	engagement	to	critically	analyze	a	movie	and	come,	after	significant	consideration,	to	realize	that	it	is	hollow	and	manipulative.	The	engagement	account,	then,	is	quite	distinct	from	those	views	in	which	the	value	of	aesthetic	appreciation	is	to	be	found	exclusively	in	positive	aesthetic	judgments,	or	the	experience	of	valuable	aesthetic	properties.17	Such	accounts	restrict	the	value	of	aesthetic	appreciation	to	making	correct	 judgments	of	aesthetically	good	objects.	The	engagement	account,	 I	 think,	better	captures	the	varied	paths	to	aesthetic	value.	For	example,	I	used	to	have	a	very	uncrit-ical	relationship	with	food.	I	ate	TV	dinners	and	fast	food.	I	liked	food	that	was	crunchy	and	salty,	and	that	was	the	end	of	the	matter.	Then,	I	took	a	trip	with	a	more	culinarily	cosmopol-itan	friend	and	become	exposed	to	more	subtle,	complex,	and	interesting	food.	My	sensibili-ties	developed,	my	tastes	transformed.	When	I	returned	to	my	small	town,	with	its	limited	repertoire	of	fast	food	joints	and	frozen	food,	those	same-samey	burgers	and	fish	sticks	had	
                                                             15	From	On	Liberty	(Mill	1967,	p.	247-9).	My	understanding	of	these	passages	follows	from	(Millgram	2004,	p.	172-3).	16	Alex	King	offers	a	similar	account	of	active	aesthetic	engagement	in	her	discussion	of	the	virtues	of	aes-thetic	subtlety.	We	seem	to	value	subtlety	in	art.	The	central	feature	of	aesthetic	subtlety	is	that	it	is	epistemi-cally	demanding.	Why	do	we	value	subtlety?	The	answer,	she	suggests,	is	that	subtlety	makes	the	appreciator	work	for	it.	Subtlety	promotes	active	engagement	in	the	appreciator,	where	heavy-handedness	discourages	agency	in	the	appreciator	(King	2017).	King’s	discussion	here	dovetails	nicely	with	my	own.	If	aesthetic	en-gagement	is	the	source	of	value,	then	heavy-handedness	is	the	failure	of	the	artwork	to	promote	engagement,	while	deference	is	the	failure	of	the	appreciator	to	pursue	valuable	engagement	when	it’s	available.	17	One	such	view	can	be	found	in	Kendall	Walton’s	claim	that	the	aesthetic	value	of	an	object	lies	in	its	ca-pacity	to	appropriately	produce	aesthetic	pleasure.	Aesthetic	pleasure,	on	his	account,	is	quite	specific:	it	is	the	pleasure	one	takes	in	one’s	admiration	or	positive	evaluation	of	something,	when	one	recognizes	that	the	object	earned	that	pleasure	(Walton	1993,	p.	504-9).	
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lost	their	appeal.	After	that,	I	had	to	travel	a	long	way	to	find	any	culinary	satisfaction.	As	a	result	of	my	culinary	awakening,	I	 found	myself	making	far	fewer	positive	aesthetic	 judg-ments.	If	the	quality	of	my	aesthetic	life	was	dependent	simply	on	the	number	of	positive	aesthetics	judgments	I	made,	then	my	aesthetic	life	would	have	simply	gotten	worse.	But	this	seems	like	the	wrong	way	to	think	about	this	story.	I’d	learned	something,	and	my	aesthetic	life	had	gotten	better	in	some	important	ways,	even	if	that	didn’t	have	a	clear	cash	value	in	terms	of	an	increased	quantity	of	positive	aesthetic	judgments.		Such	a	positive	account	of	value	could	try	to	respond	by	saying	that	the	value	of	greater	understanding	lay	in	my	clearing	the	ground	of	the	crud	and	making	room	for	better	pleas-ures.	But	notice	that	I	only	get	that	pay-off	if	I	have	adequate	access	to	better	quality	aesthetic	objects	—	which	isn’t	the	case	in	my	food	story.	Consider,	instead,	what	the	engagement	ac-count	has	to	say	about	this	sort	of	life	arc.	The	engagement	account	is	free	to	distribute	the	value	through	all	sorts	of	activities	involved	with	generating	judgments.	Rendering	a	nega-tive	judgment	of	an	object	through	sensitive	engagement	with	its	particularities	can,	in	and	of	itself,	be	a	valuable	activity.	Of	course,	a	life	full	of	only	negative	judgment	of	boring	objects	would	be	lacking	many	distinctive	kinds	of	aesthetic	value;	it	would	miss,	for	example,	the	values	associated	with	having	deep	and	lasting	engagements	with	a	complex,	subtle	works.	But	coming	to	have	negative	judgments	through	an	engaged	process	is	certainly	part	of	the	value	story.		This	line	of	thinking`	opens	the	door	to	all	sorts	of	other	possibilities.	For	example:	we	might	have	thought	that	we	had	long	conversations	about	art	in	order	to	get	the	right	judg-ments.	The	engagement	account	suggests,	instead,	that	we	might	be	pursuing	correct	judg-ments	so	that	we	can	have	all	these	lovely,	careful	conversations.	
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Correctness	and	engagement	How,	then,	are	we	to	square	an	engagement-centric	picture	of	value	with	the	apparent	drive	for	aesthetic	correctness?	I	mean	correctness	here	in	several	senses.	We	want	to	attrib-ute	the	right	aesthetic	properties	to	the	work.	We	want	to	have	the	correct	overall	judgments	of	the	aesthetic	quality	and	worth	of	a	work.	And	we	want	those	judgments	and	attributions	to	be	responsive	to	genuine	details	in	the	work.	And,	as	Fabian	Dorsch	points	out,	we	expect	our	aesthetic	 interlocutors	to	be	able	to	provide	reasons	for	their	aesthetic	 judgments,	 to	defend	their	claims	and	point	out	supporting	details	—	or	we	lose	respect	for	them	(Dorsch	2013).18	What’s	more,	we	don’t	simply	stop	when	we	have	a	pleasing	response	or	interpre-tation	of	a	work;	we	push	on	to	make	sure	that	our	response	is	sensitive	to	the	complex	ac-tuality	of	the	work.	Without	that	drive	to	correctness,	we	would	be	tempted	to	stop	thinking	about	the	work	as	soon	as	were	pleased	by	it.	We	would	not	have	any	reason	to	push	on,	since	we	might	end	up	discovering	some	subtle	flaw	that	shattered	our	enjoyment.		One	might	be	then	tempted	to	reason	in	the	following	way:	since	my	actions	are	oriented	towards	the	goal	of	correctness,	then	the	purpose	of	the	practice	of	aesthetic	judgment	must	itself	be	correctness.	But	I	do	not	think	that	this	is	right.	The	goal	at	which	we	aim	during	an	activity	is	not	necessarily	the	same	as	our	purpose	for	taking	up	the	activity,	nor	is	achieving	that	local	goal	the	only	possible	source	of	value	for	an	activity.	Some	people	try	to	catch	fish	to	achieve	a	certain	meditative	state	of	mind	and	some	people	try	to	climb	mountains	for	the	
                                                             18	See	also	(Cavedon-Taylor	2017)	for	a	useful	further	discussion.	
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sake	of	their	health.	I	myself	relax	after	a	hard	day	of	philosophy	by	doing	some	rock	climb-ing.	Notice	that	I	pursue	my	larger	purpose	–	relaxation	–	by	focusing	on	a	local	goal	–	getting	to	the	top	of	the	rock.	But	it	doesn’t	actually	matter	for	my	purposes	if	I	actually	get	to	the	top;	it	only	matters	that,	in	trying	to	get	to	the	top,	I	managed	to	clear	my	head.19		This	complex	relationship	between	goals	and	purposes	 is,	 I	 think,	easiest	 to	see	when	they	are	formalized	in	games.	In	every	game,	there	is	a	goal.	For	simplicity’s	sake,	let’s	say	that	the	goal	of	a	game	is	winning.	There	are	two	kinds	of	motivational	states	one	might	take	towards	game-play.	First,	one	might	play	the	game	for	the	sake	of	the	value	of	winning	or	what	follows	from	winning.	Call	this	achievement	play.	Second,	one	might	take	on	the	goal	of	winning	for	the	sake	of	the	activity	of	trying	to	win.	Call	this	striving	play.	We	can	find	evi-dence	of	striving	play	in	many	of	our	game-playing	practices.	First,	consider	our	long-term	manipulations	of	our	capacity	to	win	a	game.	When	I	play	board	games	with	my	spouse,	we	both	try	our	best	to	win.	But,	so	long	as	our	matches	are	close	and	exciting,	we	will	avoid,	say,	reading	strategy	guides	on	our	own.	We	are	trying	not	to	outpace	each	other.	If	one	of	us	become	too	much	more	skillful	than	the	other,	then	the	contest	would	lose	its	savor.	This	reveals	that	we	are	striving	players	and	not	achievement	players.	Winning	is	not	the	point	for	us.	We	each	pursue	winning	locally,	during	the	game	itself,	but	in	the	long	term,	we	ma-nipulate	our	abilities,	not	for	the	sake	of	maximizing	our	wins,	but	for	the	sake	of	the	quality	of	the	struggle.	20	
                                                             19	Discussions	of	such	structures	have	sometimes	come	up	under	discussions	of	self-effacing	ends	—	that	is,	ends	that	cannot	be	achieved	through	direct	pursuit	(Parfit	1984,	p.	23-4;	Keller	2007;	Annas	2008;	Pet-tigrove	2011,	p.	192-3).		20	The	discussion	of	striving	play	in	this	section	is	a	condensed	version	of	my	account	of	the	motivational	structure	of	game-play,	developed	at	length	elsewhere	(Nguyen	2019;	2020).	The	present	paper	has	its	ori-gins	in	some	invaluable	comments	by	Servaas	van	der	Berg,	who	suggested	that	my	discussion	of	games	and	striving	could	fruitfully	be	brought	to	bear	on	some	key	questions	of	aesthetics.	Van	der	Berg	has	since	ap-plied	my	account	of	striving	play	to	offer	his	own	account	of	the	distinctiveness	of	appreciative	perception.	
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	Next,	consider	what	we	might	call	stupid	games.	A	stupid	game	is	one	where	the	best	part	of	the	game	is	losing,	but	failure	is	only	fun	if	you	were	actively	pursuing	the	win.	Examples	of	stupid	games	include	Twister,	the	children’s	game	of	Telephone,	and	many	drinking	games.	With	stupid	games,	we	must	aim	at	success,	but	what	we	actually	want	to	do	is	to	fail	in	the	attempt.	 In	stupid	games,	our	goal	and	purpose	clearly	come	apart.	 If	we	can	play	stupid	games,	then	striving	play	must	be	possible.		Striving	play	 involves	 a	motivational	 inversion.	 In	normal	practical	 life,	 one	 takes	 the	means	for	the	sake	of	the	ends.	In	striving	play,	one	selects	the	ends	for	the	sake	of	the	means	it	puts	one	through.	It	is	simple,	then,	to	square	the	engagement	account	with	the	apparent	goal	of	correctness.	We	need	only	allow	that	aesthetic	appreciation	is	a	striving	activity.	In	aesthetic	appreciation,	we	aim	at	correctness,	but	correctness	is	not	the	purpose.	It	is	only	to	right	goal	to	adopt	in	order	to	become	engaged	in	a	desirable	form	of	activity.		I	 am	not	here	 claiming	 that	 the	practice	of	 aesthetic	 appreciation	 is	 a	game,	but	 I	 am	claiming	that	it	has	a	similarly	inverted	motivational	structure.	Importantly,	this	does	not	commit	us	 to	 the	view	 that	aesthetic	 engagement	 is	 intrinsically	valuable.	Let’s	 return	 to	games	for	the	moment.	The	distinction	between	striving	play	and	achievement	play	is	not	the	 same	 as	 the	 distinction	 between	 intrinsic	 and	 extrinsic	 value.	 The	 intrinsic/extrinsic	value	distinction	concerns	whether	something	is	valuable	in	itself	or	whether	it	is	valuable	as	a	means	to	an	end.	The	striving/achievement	play	distinction,	on	the	other	hand,	concerns	where	that	value	adheres.	It	is	possible	to	be	an	intrinsic	achievement	player	and	play	for	the	value	of	the	win	itself,	or	to	be	an	extrinsic	achievement	player	and	play	for	the	value	of	what	
                                                             Appreciation,	he	argues,	involves	the	special	inverted	motivational	state,	which	explains	its	distinctive	mode	of	attentional	guidance	(Van	der	Berg	2019).	I	take	our	discussions	to	be	compatible	and	complementary,	though	they	are	argumentatively	independent.	
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follows	from	the	win,	like	money	or	honor.	Similarly,	it	is	possible	to	be	an	intrinsic	striving	player	and	play	for	the	intrinsic	value	of	the	striving	itself,	or	an	extrinsic	striving	player	and	play	for	the	value	of	what	follows	from	striving	—	as	I	might	if,	say,	I	ran	marathons	for	my	health.	Thus,	in	claiming	that	aesthetic	appreciation	is	a	striving	activity,	I	am	only	claiming	that	the	value	adheres	to	the	activity	of	appreciation,	rather	than	to	the	ends	of	that	activity.	I	leave	open	the	question	of	whether	that	activity	is	intrinsically	or	extrinsically	valuable.	Cer-tainly,	one	could	think	that	the	activity	was	valuable	in	itself.	However,	the	engagement	ac-count	is	also	compatible	with	views	that	attribute	extrinsic	value	to	aesthetic	engagement.	Consider,	for	example,	the	lingering	effect	of	aesthetic	experiences	—	for	example,	the	fact	that,	after	a	day	of	looking	at	paintings	in	museums,	one’s	experiences	of	the	rest	of	the	world	will	be	enhanced	(Nanay	2016,	p.	16-17).	The	pursuit	of	that	positive	aftereffect	still	counts	as	a	striving	activity,	so	 long	as	 it	 is	 the	process	of	engagement	that	creates	 the	 lingering	aftereffect.	I	have	reason	to	judge	for	myself,	rather	than	deferring	to	another,	since	it	is	the	act	of	judging	for	myself	which	leads	to	the	extrinsically	valuable	consequence.21		Of	course,	this	 invites	a	further	question:	why	is	the	pursuit	of	aesthetic	correctness	a	valuable	activity?	One	might	think	that	aesthetic	engagement	would	be	improved	if	it	were	freed	from	the	burden	of	correctness.	Why	not	just	let	our	imagination	run	free	and	ascribe	to	 the	world	whatever	 aesthetic	 properties	 and	make	whatever	 aesthetic	 judgments	we	wished?		The	analogy	with	games	is	particularly	useful	here.	In	Bernard	Suits’s	account	of	games,	
                                                             21	This	is	why	I	do	use	the	language	of	‘striving’	rather	than	that	of	‘autotelicity’.	The	latter	term	refers	specifically	to	intrinsically	valuable	striving	activities.	
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to	 play	 a	 game	 is	 to	 take	 on	 the	 pursuit	 of	 some	 goal,	 along	with	 some	 unnecessary	 re-strictions	and	obstacles	on	achieving	that	goal,	for	the	sake	of	the	activity	they	make	possible	(Suits	2014).	The	goals	of	games	aren’t	usually	valuable	in	themselves.	The	nature	of	a	game-goal	can	usually	be	best	explained	in	terms	of	the	nature	of	the	activity	it	inspires.	In	basket-ball,	there’s	no	special	value	in	getting	this	ball	through	that	hoop	in	and	of	itself.	We	want	to	get	the	ball	through	the	hoop	while	facing	opponents	and	obeying	the	dribbling	constraint	because	we	want	to	engage	in	the	activity	of	dodging,	jumping,	and	shooting.	We	want	to	get	to	the	top	of	this	cliff	by	going	the	hard	way	—	up	the	steep	face,	using	only	our	hands	and	feet	—	because	we	want	to	engage	in	the	particular	activity	of	rock	climbing.	We	want	to	be	forced	to	coordinate	delicate	balance	and	powerful,	graceful,	precise	movement	in	a	unified	effort	to	surmount	the	challenges	of	the	rock.22	Notice	the	relationship	here	between	the	ac-tivity,	the	goal,	and	the	rules.	In	free	climbing,	the	climber	must	ascend	only	by	using	their	hands	and	feet,	applied	only	to	the	rock	itself.23	They	are	not	allowed	to	pull	on	the	rope	or	the	various	pieces	of	gear	attached	to	the	rock;	the	rope	is	only	there	as	a	safety	measure.	Some	novice	climbers	complain	about	these	strange	restrictions.	The	requirement	to	ascend	by	using	only	the	rock	strikes	them	as	annoyingly	arbitrary.	Why	submit	to	these	restrictions,	when	one	could	just	swing	around	on	the	rope	as	one	pleases?	Experienced	climbers,	how-ever,	understand	the	purpose	of	these	restrictions.	When	you	are	allowed	to	ascend	by	pull-ing	on	the	rope	and	the	gear,	then	you	end	up	repeating	the	same	sorts	of	movements	on	any	
                                                             22	One	might	wish	to	say	here	that	the	game	goal	must	be	combined	with	the	constraints	to	produce	the	activity.	Importantly,	Suits’s	account	of	a	game	goal	folds	in	the	notion	of	a	constraint.	A	lusory	goal,	in	Suits’s	account,	is	some	desirable	state	of	affairs	which	may	only	be	reached	while	obeying	certain	constraints.	‘Mak-ing	a	basket’,	in	basketball,	only	occurs	when	one	is	following	the	rules	(36-43).		
23 Many	non-climbers	confuse	‘free	climbing,’	which	is	climbing	with	the	hands	and	feet	only,	while	using	a	safety	rope,’	with	‘free	soloing,’	which	is	climbing	with	no	safety	rope	at	all.	There	is	a	form	of	climbing	in	which	one	was	allowed	to	pull	on	the	gear	–	‘aid	climbing’.	That	style	was	common	in	the	early	days	of	climb-ing	but	has	now	been	largely	abandoned	in	favor	of	free	climbing.		
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sort	 of	 rock.	 The	 requirement	 to	 ascend	 using	 only	 features	 of	 the	 rock	 itself	 forces	 the	climber	to	attend	to	the	distinctive	details	of	each	different	rock	face.	It	forces	the	climber	to	invent	new	and	creative	solutions	in	response	to	the	widely	varying	details	of	the	rock.		We	can	offer	a	similar	explanation	for	our	practice	of	aesthetic	appreciation.	As	with	rock	climbing,	aesthetic	appreciation	is	a	practice	which	involves	pursuing	a	goal	inside	certain	restrictions.	We	are	to	try	to	arrive	at	correct	aesthetic	 judgments	through	the	use	of	our	own	faculties,	without	deferring	to	others.	As	with	climbing,	the	goal	and	the	restrictions	can	be	explained	in	terms	of	the	form	of	activity	they	inspire.	The	aim	of	getting	correct	aesthetic	judgments	via	our	own	faculties	and	abilities	drives	us	towards	a	very	particular	sort	of	ac-tivity:	one	that	is	oriented	around	sensitivity,	refinement,	care,	and	responsiveness	to	detail.	If	my	aesthetic	activities	weren’t	oriented	towards	getting	it	right,	I	would	be	free	to	imagine	and	impose	as	I	please.	I	would	have	no	motivation	to	stick	to	the	details	of	the	object	and	thus	no	reason	to	study	that	object	with	care.	Such	free-form	activity	is	likely	to	satisfy	one	set	of	interests	—	say,	in	having	imaginative	freedom,	unfettered	creativity,	and	the	like.	But	we	bring	to	bear	an	entirely	different	set	of	capacities	when	we	aim	at	correct	aesthetic	judg-ment.	In	aesthetic	appreciation,	we	engage	in	perception	and	cognition	under	the	require-ment	of	loyalty	to	the	details	of	external	objects	in	all	their	peculiar	differentness.	The	best	explanation	of	our	demand	for	direct	autonomy	in	aesthetic	appreciation,	then,	is	that	we	value	the	specific	form	of	activity	involved	in	pursuing	correct	aesthetic	judgment.	We	value	the	process	of	hunting	for	subtle	details	that	we	missed	the	first	time	around,	of	struggling	to	create	interpretations	that	fit	with	the	rich	actuality	of	the	world.	The	parallel	with	games	is,	 I	think,	particularly	useful	 in	thinking	about	why	we	avoid	deferring	to	aesthetic	testimony	and	aesthetic	experts.	As	Suits	points	out,	game-play	is,	by	
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its	very	nature,	essentially	inefficient	with	respect	to	its	in-game	goals	(35-36).	We	aim	at	the	end	of	crossing	the	finish	line	of	the	marathon,	with	the	restrictions	of	not	taking	a	taxi	or	riding	a	bicycle,	in	order	to	engage	in	the	activity	of	running.	Aesthetic	appreciation	is,	in	a	similar	way,	inefficient	in	its	pursuit	of	correctness.	If	we	thought	the	goal	of	aesthetic	ap-preciation	was	correctness,	then	we	would	be	interested	in	maximally	efficient	pathways	to	that	goal,	such	as	being	guided	by	experts	or	acquiring	beliefs	through	testimony.	We	refuse	to	defer	precisely	because	that	restriction	drives	us	towards	a	particular	form	of	valuable	activity.	The	aesthetic	appreciator	who	defers	to	testimony,	then,	is	making	the	same	mistake	as	the	marathon	runner	who	takes	a	taxi	to	the	finish	line.	They	mistakenly	take	the	local	goal	for	the	purpose	of	the	activity	and	thereby	miss	out	on	the	real	value.	Their	shortcut	defeats	the	whole	point.		The	parallel	structure	will	be	even	clearer	if	we	consider	more	overtly	intellectual	games.	When	I	am	reading	a	certain	sort	of	traditional	mystery	novel,	I	am	trying	to	figure	out	who	the	 culprit	 is	 ahead	 of	 the	 big	 reveal.	 Notice	 a	 few	 things	 about	 the	 activity	 of	 puzzling	through	a	mystery	novel.	First,	 there	 is	a	correct	answer	to	my	questions.	Second,	 I	don’t	value	 knowing	 those	 answers	 simply	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 the	 knowledge	 itself	—	otherwise	 I	would	turn	to	the	last	page	or	read	the	spoilers	on	Wikipedia,	thus	saving	myself	the	time	and	effort	of	actually	reading	the	book.	Third,	the	inverted	motivational	structure	of	striving	explains	why	I	don’t	simply	look	up	the	answer	online.24	Puzzling	through	a	mystery	novel	is	a	striving	activity.	We	chase	the	right	answer	by	inefficient	means	for	the	sake	of	the	strug-gle.	The	practice	of	aesthetic	appreciation	 involves	a	similar	 inverted	value	structure.	We	
                                                             24	Some	people	dislike	the	mystery,	and	only	want	the	story,	and	so	do	flip	to	the	end.	In	this	case,	I	sug-gest,	they	are	engaged	with	a	mystery	novel	as	a	work	of	fiction,	and	not	with	its	game	aspect.		
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make	our	judgments	autonomously	because	deference	to	another	would	be	like	flipping	to	the	end	of	the	book.			 We	now	have	an	explanation	for	the	so-called	pessimistic	intuitions	about	aesthetic	testimony.	Why	does	it	seem	so	wrong	to	us	to	acquire	aesthetic	judgments	through	testi-mony?	It	isn’t	because	we	cannot	transmit	aesthetic	knowledge	through	testimony.	Rather,	it	is	because	getting	that	knowledge	through	testimony	would	defeat	the	whole	point	of	the	exercise.	Notice,	too,	that	the	engagement	account	has	the	resources	to	explain	the	complexities	of	our	variable	willingness	to	use	testimony	from	aesthetic	experts.	For	example:	we	seem	will-ing	to	use	expert	testimony	to	give	us	recommendations	about	what	movies	to	watch	and	which	restaurants	to	try,	but	we	seem	unwilling	to	defer	to	their	expertise	in	forming	our	own	 judgments.25	 This	 is	 nicely	 explained	 by	 the	 engagement	 account.	 Experts	 are	 good	guides	to	the	sorts	of	objects	that	can	sustain	a	long,	involved	and	satisfying	engagement.	So	when	we	trust	their	recommendations	and	pay	attention	to	what	they	recommend,	we	are	more	likely	to	have	such	engagements.	But	if	we	defer	to	their	judgments	rather	than	coming	up	with	our	own,	then	we	will	skip	over	the	very	process	of	engagement	which	we	value.	The	best	way	to	use	testimony	to	foster	quality	engagement,	then,	is	to	use	testimony	as	a	guide	for	where	to	spend	our	attention,	but	not	as	a	substitute	for	the	ensuing	process	of	judgment.		The	 engagement	 account	 can	 also	 explain	 another	 asymmetry,	which	has	 been	 called	Kant’s	problem	of	aesthetic	testimony.	Suppose	I	have	listened	to	Migos’s	Atlanta	trap	classic	
Culture	a	 handful	 of	 times	 and	 found	 it	 repetitive	 and	dull.	 Then,	my	musically	 sensitive	
                                                             25	See	the	discussion	of	recommendations	and	autonomy	in	(Hopkins	2011,	p.	154-5;	Nguyen	2017)	and	the	distinction	between	aesthetic	judgment	and	aesthetic	belief	in	(Gorodeisky	and	Marcus	2018,	p.	135-7).			
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friend	and	trusted	confidante	tells	me	that	it	is,	in	fact,	a	revolution	in	rap	because	of	how	it	deploys	its	rhythmic	patterns	to	create	new	kinds	of	musical	space,	and	that	I’ve	missed	its	subtle,	but	profound,	groove.	This	gives	me	a	reason	to	listen	again	and	reconsider	my	judg-ment.	As	Hopkins	puts	 it,	we	take	contrary	aesthetic	 testimony	to	be	capable	of	 inspiring	doubt	–	to	give	us	reason	to	reconsider	something.	But	I	will	not,	of	course,	simply	adopt	my	musically	sensitive	friend’s	judgment	outright.	Here	is	the	problem:	what	force	could	aes-thetic	testimony	have,	that	it	could	provide	negative	weight	for	inspiring	doubt	but,	at	the	same	time,	fail	to	provide	a	positive	basis	for	deference	(Hopkins	2001)?	26	As	Keren	Goro-deisky	and	Eric	Marcus	put	it,	Kant’s	Problem	is	how	we	thread	the	needle	between	doubt	and	deference.	It	looks	like	any	explanation	which	can	group	the	doubt	from	testimony	will	also	force	us	to	defer	to	contrary	judgments,	when	the	source	is	sufficiently	expert.	Goro-deisky	and	Marcus	offer	a	complex	Kantian	solution	for	threading	that	needle	(Gorodeisky	and	Marcus	2018,	122-137).	But	the	engagement	account	offers	us	a	different,	and	consider-ably	simpler,	solution.	We	have	sculpted	a	practice	of	aesthetic	appreciation	with	norms	set	to	drive	us	towards	greater	engagement.	We	permit	testimony	to	raise	doubt	because	adopt-ing	that	norm	will	drive	us	toward	greater	engagement.	That	norm	will	generate	reasons	to	look	again	and	increase	the	likelihood	of	paying	attention	to	works	that	can	sustain	deeper	engagement.	But	we	don’t	permit	deference	to	testimony	in	forming	our	judgment	because	that	would	cut	off	any	deeper	engagement.	The	norm	that	permits	doubt	from	testimony	is	engagement-enhancing,	but	the	norm	that	permits	deference	from	testimony	is	engagement-terminating.	The	permission	to	doubt	from	testimony,	but	the	prohibition	on	deference	to	testimony,	are	good	norms	to	have	because,	together,	they	sculpt	the	practice	of	aesthetic	
                                                             
26 For related discussions, see (McGonigal 2006; Robson 2015). 
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appreciation	in	a	way	that	supports	greater	engagement.	Importantly,	the	engagement	account	is	intended	only	as	an	analysis	of	the	practice	of	aesthetic	appreciation.	There	are	other	practices	 in	 the	aesthetic	domain	with	other	pur-poses,	to	which	the	engagement	account	does	not	apply.	Consider,	for	example,	the	practice	of	art	history.	Art	history	is	oriented	towards	the	generation	of	correct	historical	facts;	it	is,	therefore,	not	a	striving	activity.	Thus,	the	account	I’ve	offered	can	explain	the	practice-de-pendent	variability	of	our	demand	for	strong	autonomy.	When	my	friends	and	I	are	in	a	mu-seum,	talking	about	the	absence	of	presence	of	gracefulness	in	a	particular	painting,	we	ought	not	to	defer	to	the	judgments	of	others.	On	the	other	hand,	if	I	am	an	art	historian	and	I	am	trying	to	track	the	movement	of	a	particular	style	through	various	places,	I	sometimes	ought	to	defer.27	The	reason	we	hold	fast	to	the	Direct	Autonomy	Principle	in	the	appreciation	case,	but	not	in	the	art	history	case,	is	that	we	are	invoking	different	practices	with	different	pur-poses.	The	value	in	art	appreciation	lies	more	in	the	process	of	judgment	than	in	having	cor-rect	judgments.	Art	historians,	on	the	other,	are	more	interested	in	the	correct	judgments	themselves.	These	different	purposes	indicate	different	norms	for	autonomy.		
Conclusions	One	might	then	ask	why	we	are	expending	all	this	striving	effort	here,	on	such	an	odd	pursuit?	Why	spend	all	this	energy	cognitively	struggling	over	paintings,	and	not	over,	say,	solving	world	poverty?	If	we	don’t	care	about	the	correctness	of	aesthetic	judgments,	ought	we	not	get	our	cognitive	kicks	where	it	might	be	of	some	use	to	the	world?	Consider	a	parallel	worry	concerning	games.	Thomas	Hurka	argues	that	the	value	of	playing	games	comes	from	
                                                             27	Case	adapted	from	(Nguyen	2017,	p.	25-26).	
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their	difficulty.	Thus,	so	long	as	we’re	not	in	utopia,	it	will	be	better	to	do	things	that	are	both	difficult	and	instrumentally	good.	For	example,	if	playing	chess	and	working	to	cure	cancer	are	both	equally	difficult,	then	the	latter	is	to	be	preferred,	for	it	is	both	difficult	and	useful	(Hurka	2006).		Hurka’s	conclusion,	I	think,	misses	much	about	the	special	value	of	games.	The	right	re-sponse	to	Hurka	is	that	the	value	of	games	lies	not	only	in	their	difficulty,	but	in	the	experi-ential	quality	of	that	difficulty	—	in	whether	the	struggle	is	interesting,	dull,	or	fascinating.28	Games	are	special	because,	in	games,	we	are	significantly	freer	to	shape	the	nature	and	de-mands	of	the	task	to	suit	us.	In	ordinary	practical	life,	our	instrumental	engagement	is	signif-icantly	constrained	by	the	goal	and	the	inflexibility	of	the	world.	The	world	can	render	our	pursuits	exhausting,	dull,	and	full	of	miserable	grinds.	The	search	for	scientific	truth,	for	ex-ample,	might	involve	some	incredibly	satisfying	intellectual	epiphanies,	but	the	nature	of	the	world	means	that	 it	also	involves	a	 lot	of	mucking	about	with	spreadsheets,	 fixing	instru-ments,	and	digging	through	hard	soil	under	the	brutal	summer	sun.	Chess,	on	the	other	hand,	is	a	practical	activity	optimized	for	the	pleasures	and	satisfactions	of	cognition.	The	nature	of	its	goal	and	the	logic	of	its	mechanics	shape	a	very	particular	practical	environment	—	one	that	has	been	made	specifically	for	our	cognitive	delight.	In	ordinary	practical	life,	we	must	bend	ourselves	and	desperately	try	to	fit	our	abilities	to	the	practical	demands	of	the	world.	In	games,	we	can	design	a	practical	world	to	fit	our	abilities	and	our	inclinations.29		Something	similar	is	true,	I	suggest,	with	the	arts.	The	activities	and	states	involved	in	
                                                             28	For	a	discussion	of	this	point,	see	(Tasioulas	2006).	29	For	an	extended	discussion	of	this	point,	see	(Nguyen	2019,	p.	429-38;	2020).	
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rendering	aesthetic	judgments	—	investigation,	sensitivity	to	perceptual	and	cognitive	de-tails,	interpretation,	empathy	—	are	also	instrumental	resources.30	In	ordinary	practical	life,	our	use	of	these	resources	is	beholden	to	the	instrumental	demands	of	the	world.	The	arts,	on	the	other	hand,	are	precisely	where	we	can	mold	the	objects	of	judgment	–	and	also	pick	the	constraints	on	how	we	are	to	judge	those	objects	–	in	order	to	shape	the	activity	of	de-ploying	these	instrumental	resources	to	our	own	satisfaction.		I	hope	it	is	clear	by	now	that	the	demand	for	direct	autonomy	isn’t	unique	to	aesthetic	appreciation.	We	should	expect	demands	for	indirect	autonomy	to	dominate	in	practices	ori-ented	towards	the	value	of	correctness	itself	—	the	empirical	sciences,	history,	and	the	judi-cial	system.	We	should	expect	various	forms	of	the	demand	for	direct	autonomy	to	dominate	in	those	practices	oriented	towards	the	value	of	engagement	in	a	process	—	aesthetic	appre-ciation,	but	also	games,	exercise,	education,	and	more.	We	should	expect	to	find	a	demand	for	direct	autonomy	for	any	activity	with	the	motivational	structure	of	striving,	rather	than	of	achievement.		Much	 of	 the	 discussion	 of	 the	 asymmetry	 between	 empirical	 judgment	 and	 aesthetic	judgment	has	presumed	that	our	peculiar	attitude	towards	aesthetic	testimony	arises	from	features	unique	to	 the	aesthetic	domain.	 Instead,	my	account	suggests	 that	 it	 is	a	general	feature	of	striving	activities.	Aesthetic	appreciation	is	one	type	of	striving	activity;	but	there	are	others.	And	there	are	non-striving	approaches	to	the	aesthetic,	as	well.	This	helps	ex-plains	another	asymmetry:	why	we	are	more	willing	to	use	aesthetic	testimony	in	art-histor-ical	contexts,	but	less	willing	to	in	art-appreciative	contexts.	An	account	that	made	autonomy	
                                                             30	Tantalizingly,	Suits’s	definition	of	play	is:	‘x	is	playing	if	and	only	if	x	has	made	a	temporary	reallocation	to	autotelic	activities	of	resources	primarily	committed	to	instrumental	purposes’	(Suits	1977,	p.	123-4).	
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a	necessary	part	of	any	aesthetic	judgment	would	not	be	able	to	explain	that	secondary	asym-metry.	The	engagement	account,	however,	has	a	tidy	explanation:	art	appreciation	is	a	striv-ing	activity,	but	art	history	is	not.		The	engagement	account	might	also	explain	a	crucial	and	under-explored	aspect	of	our	relationship	with	 art	 and	 the	 aesthetic.	We	 seek	 to	understand	works,	 but	we	are	disap-pointed	when	we	reach	that	understanding	too	quickly.	We	wish	to	understand	artworks,	but	when	 the	artworks	are	 too	easily	understood,	we	 judge	 them	poorly	—	we	call	 them	‘shallow’	or	‘thin’.	By	many	accounts,	the	greatest	works	are	the	ones	that	are	the	most	end-lessly	accommodating	of	interpretation	and	inquiry.	I	love	the	poet	Tu	Fu	precisely	because	I	try	to	understand	him	and	I	never	get	to	the	end;	every	time	I	re-read	a	verse,	I	find	some	new	subtlety	or	connection.	The	engagement	account	explains	this:	correct	aesthetic	judg-ment	is	the	goal,	but	not	the	purpose.	Thus,	we	are	disappointed	when	our	fascinating	jour-ney	is	cut	off	by	our	too-quick	arrival	at	the	apparent	destination.	At	the	same	time,	we	can-not	undermine	the	sincerity	of	our	attempts	at	correctness	to	forestall	such	a	finish,	for	that	would	undermine	our	absorption	in	the	investigative	attempt.31	We	want	objects	which	we	can	sincerely	try	to	understand	thoroughly,	but	which	endlessly	defy	a	complete	understand-ing.	We	want	subtlety,	depth,	and	mystery.	But	the	engagement	account	also	helps	to	explain	why	most	beloved	artworks	are,	typically,	not	purely	ambiguous.	For	a	blank	or	impossibly	cryptic	work,	the	process	of	trying	to	understand	cannot	even	get	off	the	ground.	What	we	seem	to	desire	 is	something	balanced	on	the	razor’s	edge	between	incomprehensible	and	shallow	—	something	which	presents	the	possibility	of	understanding	as	an	apparent,	but	ever-elusive	target.	If	we	simply	valued	having	correct	judgments,	we	should	seek	easy-to-
                                                             31	For	a	further	discussion	of	this	point	in	the	context	of	game-play,	see	(Nguyen	2019,	p.	440-6).		
33 
understand	works.	If	we	valued	having	correct	but	difficult	judgments,	we	should	seek	works	that	were	difficult	to	understand,	but	which	came	with	assurances	that	the	task	of	compre-hension	would	eventually	terminate.	Instead,	we	seem	have	the	greatest	esteem	for	those	works	that	never	admit	of	a	completed	and	finalized	set	of	judgments.	We	cherish	a	sort	of	aesthetic	bottomlessness.	Our	 love	of	 this	 tempting,	but	ever-retreating	target,	 is	best	ex-plained	by	attributing	to	us	a	value	for	the	pursuit,	and	not	the	having,	of	correct	aesthetic	judgments.32		And	here,	I	think,	we	can	find	a	hint	about	the	difference	between	moral	autonomy	and	aesthetic	autonomy.	The	demands	of	moral	autonomy	may	forbid	us	from	simply	deferring	outright.	But	moral	autonomy	is	usually	taken	to	be	compatible	a	relatively	high	degree	of	guidance,	especially	for	the	sake	of	correctness.33	In	the	practice	of	aesthetic	appreciation,	on	the	other	hand,	we	are	more	suspicious	of	thoroughgoing	guidance	and	place	a	relatively	higher	importance	on	self-direction	over	correctness.	Imagine	how	we	would	feel	if	the	field	of	philosophical	ethics,	after	millennia	of	work,	finally	came	to	an	agreement	about	the	right	ethical	theory,	and	produced	a	text	with	careful	and	convincing	arguments	that	cleared	up	the	major	moral	dilemma	and	settled	the	major	questions?	I	think	we	might	feel	rather	re-lieved;	we	might	even	feel	that	philosophy	had	partially	redeemed	itself.	I	would	certainly	wish	to	read	it	to	judge	its	arguments	for	myself,	and	I	would	be	happy	if	I	were	to	be	con-vinced	and	all	my	moral	worries	settled	once	and	for	all.	And	I	would	certainly	wish	to	teach	
                                                             32	For	some	suggestive	resonances	to	this	point,	see	(Nehamas	2010).	33	The	terrain	here	is	vast.	Some	key	accounts	include	(Jones	1999;	McGrath	2011;	Nickel	2001;	Zagzebski	2012).	For	my	own	take	on	moral	autonomy	and	testimony	please	see	(Nguyen	2010).		Finally,	note	that	(Driver	2006)	has	considered	the	asymmetry	between	aesthetic	and	moral	testimony,	but	runs	it	in	the	oppo-site	direction	—	she	thinks	we	care	less	about	autonomy	in	aesthetic	judgment,	because	we	are	willing	to	act	on	recommendations.	Hopefully	the	cases	from	this	paper	make	the	case	that	the	issue	is	more	complicated	than	that.	
34 
this	book	to	my	undergraduates.	 I	would	certainly	want	 them	to	read	the	arguments	and	consider	them	for	their	own,	to	be	convinced	through	their	own	process	of	reasoning	—	but	the	availability	of	convincing,	conclusive	arguments	here	would	be	a	good	thing.	How	we	would	feel,	on	the	other	hand,	if	the	world	of	literary	scholarship	came	out	with	a	conclusive	analysis	of	Joyce’s	Ulysses,	which	settled	every	debate,	answered	every	question,	and	disam-biguated	every	term,	in	convincing	and	comprehensible	arguments?	I	think	I	would	feel	ra-ther	sad	—	that	the	world	of	the	arts	had	been	substantially	diminished.	And	I,	for	one,	would	not	wish	to	read	it.34	We	pursue	moral	judgments	with	the	hopes	of	getting	it	right,	but	we	pursue	aesthetic	judgments	for	the	sake	of	the	activity	of	engagement.35			
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